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Fragile Redistribution Choices behind a Veil of Ignorance

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  • Bukszar, Ed
  • Knetsch, Jack L

Abstract

Prescription dealing with redistribution questions are often influenced by the presumption that individuals behind a veil of ignorance will choose rules that lead to a greater equality of outcomes. However, such preferences may be fragile and dependent on particular circumstances. To the extent that initial distributions are seen to be deserved, for example, people may not choose to impose losses on some individuals to confer benefits on others. A series of tests in which individuals chose between alternative distribution rules under circumstances approximating a veil of ignorance showed large differences in redistribution preferences. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

Volume (Year): 14 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 63-74

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:14:y:1997:i:1:p:63-74

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100299

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Cited by:
  1. Fredrik Carlsson & Dinky Daruvala & Olof Johansson-Stenman, 2005. "Are People Inequality-Averse, or Just Risk-Averse?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(3), pages 375-396, 08.
  2. John Bone & Paolo Crosetto & John D. Hey & Carmen Pasca, 2013. "Change versus choice: eliciting attitudes to fair compensations," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-029, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  3. Helgeson, Jennifer & Dietz, Simon & Atkinson, Giles D. & Hepburn, Cameron & Sælen, Håkon, 2009. "Siblings, not triplets: social preferences for risk, inequality and time in discounting climate change," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 3(26), pages 1-28.
  4. Knetsch, Jack L. & Wong, Wei-Kang, 2009. "The endowment effect and the reference state: Evidence and manipulations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 407-413, August.
  5. Cameron Hepburn & Hakon Sælen & Giles Atkinson, 2008. "Risk, inequality and time in the welfare economics of climate change: is the workhorse model underspecified?," Economics Series Working Papers 400, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  6. Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Carlsson, Fredrik & Daruvala, Dinky, 2001. "Measuring Hypothetical Grandparents Preferences For Equality And Relative Standings," Working Papers in Economics 42, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  7. Fredrik Andersson & Carl Hampus Lyttkens, 1999. "Preferences for equity in health behind a veil of ignorance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(5), pages 369-378.

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