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Spectators versus stakeholders with or without veil of ignorance: the difference it makes for justice and chosen distribution criteria

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo Becchetti

    (Department of Economics, Universitˆ Tor Vergata)

  • Giacomo Degli Antoni

    (University of Milano-Bicocca)

  • Stefania Ottone

    (University of Milano-Bicocca)

  • Nazaria Solferino

    (University of Calabria-Unical)

Abstract

We document with a randomized experiment that being spectators and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders with veil of ignorance on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria to prefer rewarding talent (vis à vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base. The removal of the veil of ignorance reduces dramatically such choice since most players opt or revise their decision in favour of the criterion which maximizes their own payoff (and, by doing so, end up being farther from the maximin choice). Large part (but not all) of the stakeholders? choices before the removal of the veil of ignorance are driven by their performance beliefs since two thirds of them choose under the veil the criterion in which they assume to perform relatively better.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Becchetti & Giacomo Degli Antoni & Stefania Ottone & Nazaria Solferino, 2011. "Spectators versus stakeholders with or without veil of ignorance: the difference it makes for justice and chosen distribution criteria," Econometica Working Papers wp31, Econometica.
    • Handle: RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp31
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    Cited by:

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    2. Daniel Müller & Sander Renes, 2021. "Fairness views and political preferences: evidence from a large and heterogeneous sample," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(4), pages 679-711, May.
    3. Müller Daniel & Sander Renes, 2019. "Fairness Views and Political Preferences - Evidence from a representative sample," Working Papers 2019-08, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    4. Daniel Müller & Sander Renes, 2017. "Fairness views and political preferences - Evidence from a large online experiment," Working Papers 2017-10, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    5. Michele Bernasconi & Enrico Longo & Valeria Maggian, 2023. "When merit breeds luck (or not): an experimental study on distributive justice," Working Papers 2023:02, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Distributive Justice; Perceived Fairness; Talent; Chance and Effort; Veil of Ignorance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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