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Voting on Tax Policy Design


Author Info

  • Lucy F. Ackert
  • Ann B. Gillette

    (Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, Georgia, and Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Georgia)

  • Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
  • Mark Rider

    (Georgia State University, Atlanta)


The authors build on the work of Engelmann and Strobel and of Ackert, Martinez-Vazquez, and Rider to examine the potential role of social preferences in tax policy design. They randomly assign each participant in a session to a group with five members. The payoffs to participants are determined by majority vote of the participants in a given group. The authors randomly assign each participant a pretax income that remains the same throughout the experiment to control for the potential confounding effect of risk-pooling equilibria. On the basis of statistical analysis of the data generated by these experiments, they find support for the hypothesis that the minimax preferences of Rawls or the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt help explain individual choices over alternative tax structures.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by in its journal Public Finance Review.

Volume (Year): 35 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 263-284

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Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:35:y:2007:i:2:p:263-284

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Related research

Keywords: equity; social preferences; inequity aversion; optimal taxation;


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Cited by:
  1. Lucy F. Ackert & Ann B. Gillette & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2009. "Risk Tolerance, Self-Interest, and Social Preferences," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University 2009-04, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised Feb 2011.
  2. Lucy Ackert & Ann Gillette & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2011. "Are benevolent dictators altruistic in groups? A within-subject design," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 307-321, September.


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