The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension

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The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension

Author Info

László Á. Kóczy (Centre for Economic Studies, Faculty of Economics and Applied Economics, Catholic University Leuven)
Luc Lauwers (Centre for Economic Studies, Faculty of Economics and Applied Economics, Catholic University Leuven)

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Abstract

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.

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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2003.50.

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Date of creation: Jun 2003
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.50

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Article
- Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc, 2007. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 277-298, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Laszlo A. Koczy & Luc Lauwers, 2004. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0421, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Laszlo A. Koczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension," Grand Coalition 44, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension," Game Theory and Information 0210002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0220, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën. [Downloadable!]
- Kóczy,László Á. & Lauwers,Luc, 2004. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," Research Memoranda 018, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1996. "A Property of the Core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 266-273, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1994. "Viable Proposals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 347-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Laszlo A. Koczy & Luc Lauwers, 2001. "The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible," Grand Coalition 52, Grand Coalition Web Site. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0219, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën. [Downloadable!]
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2001. "The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible," Game Theory and Information 0110001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jun 2002. [Downloadable!]
- Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc, 2004. "The coalition structure core is accessible," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 86-93, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
E. Kalai & D. Schmeidler, 1975. "An Admissible Set Occurring in Various Bargaining Situations," Discussion Papers 191, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Kalai, Ehud & Schmeidler, David, 1977. "An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 402-411, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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