A comparison of dynamic cooperative models of coalition formation
AbstractCooperative games model situations where the actors can collaborate, can form coalitions. We know many static models, but our world is more complex. Despite the fact that there have been several experimental studies on coalition formation there are only very few theoretical papers dealing with the problem in a dynamic context. These papers are not only few in number, but the presented concepts are poorly related. In this paper I discuss two approaches: I explain the process of dynamic coalition formation, and I look at and review a learning model.
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This chapter was published in: György Kadocsa (ed.) , , pages 225-232, 2010.
This item is provided by Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management in its series Proceedings-8th International Conference on Mangement,Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2010) with number 225-232.
game theory; cooperative games; dynamic coalition; equilibrium; core;
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