The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible

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The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible

Author Info

László Á. Kóczy
Luc Lauwers

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Abstract

For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation - which we label outsider independent - is employed.

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Paper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën in its series Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers with number ces0219.

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Date of creation: Mar 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0219

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Article
- Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc, 2004. "The coalition structure core is accessible," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 86-93, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2001. "The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible," Game Theory and Information 0110001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jun 2002. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-04-12 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2008-04-12 (Game Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1996. "A Property of the Core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 266-273, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Greenberg, Joseph, 1994. "Coalition structures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 37, pages 1305-1337 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1994. "Viable Proposals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 347-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Green, Jerry R, 1974. "The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(1), pages 21-34, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Kóczy,László Á., 2005. "The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks," Research Memoranda 042, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Laszlo.A.Koczy, 2005. "The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0512, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Koczy, Laszlo A., 2006. "The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 56-64, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gabrielle Demange, 2006. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games," PSE Working Papers 2006-38, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Demange, Gabrielle, 2009. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 83-104, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kóczy,László Á. & Lauwers,Luc, 2004. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," Research Memoranda 018, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Laszlo A. Koczy & Luc Lauwers, 2004. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0421, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2003. "The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension," Working Papers 2003.50, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension," Game Theory and Information 0210002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0220, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën. [Downloadable!]
- Koczy, Laszlo A. & Lauwers, Luc, 2007. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 277-298, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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