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The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks

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  • Kóczy,László Á.

    (METEOR)

Abstract

We show the existence of an upper bound for the number of blocks required to get from one imputation to another provided that accessibility holds. The bound depends only on the number of players in the TU game considered. For the class of games with non-empty cores this means that the core can be reached via a bounded sequence of blocks.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 042.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2005042

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Keywords: mathematical economics;

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  1. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-80, November.
  2. Perry, M. & Rany, P., 1992. "A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics 9203, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  3. Dionysius Glycopantis & Allan Muir & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2003. "On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 495-526, 03.
  4. Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1994. "Viable Proposals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 347-59, May.
  5. László Á. Kóczy & Luc Lauwers, 2002. "The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën ces0219, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  6. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eiichi Miyagawa & Licun Xue, 2002. "Random paths to stability in the roommate problem," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0102-65, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  7. Allan Muir & Nicholas C. Yannelis & Dionysius Glycopantis, 2001. "An extensive form interpretation of the private core," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 293-319.
  8. Green, Jerry R, 1974. "The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 42(1), pages 21-34, January.
  9. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
  10. Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1996. "A Property of the Core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 266-273, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2013. "Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core," Computational Statistics, Springer, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 187-202, October.
  2. Yang, Yi-You, 2011. "Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 65-70, July.
  3. Szikora Péter, 2011. "Tanítás értelmezhetõ-e, mint egy kooperatív dinamikus játék?," Proceedings- 9th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2011), Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  4. Yang, Yi-You, 2012. "On the accessibility of core-extensions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 687-698.
  5. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2013. "An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1-9.
  6. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2011. "On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core," MPRA Paper 29755, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2010. "On the number of blocks required to access the core," MPRA Paper 26578, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Yang, Yi-You, 2010. "On the accessibility of the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 194-199, May.

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