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The coalition structure core is accessible

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  • Koczy, Laszlo A.
  • Lauwers, Luc

Abstract

For each outcome (i.e.~a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation - which we label outsider independent - is employed.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 48 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 86-93

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:86-93

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. Greenberg, Joseph, 1994. "Coalition structures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 37, pages 1305-1337 Elsevier.
  2. Green, Jerry R, 1974. "The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(1), pages 21-34, January.
  3. Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Xue, Licun, 2007. "Coalitions, agreements and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 105-125, September.
  4. Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1996. "A Property of the Core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 266-273, February.
  5. Sengupta, Abhijit & Sengupta, Kunal, 1994. "Viable Proposals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 347-59, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Koczy, Laszlo A., 2006. "The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 56-64, December.
  2. Péter Szikora, 2013. "Introduction into the literature of cooperative game theory with special emphasis on dynamic games and the core," Proceedings- 11th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2013), Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  3. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590290 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Kóczy,László Á. & Lauwers,Luc, 2004. "The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Demange, Gabrielle, 2009. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 83-104, January.
  6. Cesco, Juan Carlos, 2008. "A general characterization for non-balanced games in terms of U-cycles," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 191(2), pages 409-415, December.
  7. Szikora Péter, 2011. "Tanítás értelmezhetõ-e, mint egy kooperatív dinamikus játék?," Proceedings- 9th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2011), Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  8. Peter Biro & Matthijs Bomhoff & Walter Kern & Petr A. Golovach & Daniel Paulusma, 2012. "Solutions for the Stable Roommates Problem with Payments," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1211, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  9. Yang, Yi-You, 2011. "Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 65-70, July.
  10. Yang, Yi-You, 2010. "On the accessibility of the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 194-199, May.
  11. Péter Biró & Gethin Norman, 2013. "Analysis of stochastic matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 1021-1040, November.
  12. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2011. "On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core," MPRA Paper 29755, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Péter Szikora, 2012. "Dynamic cooperative models of coalition formation and the core," Proceedings- 10th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2012), Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  14. Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2013. "Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 187-202, October.

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