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R&D-Cooperating Lagards versus a Technological Leader

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  • C. HALMENSCHLAGER

Abstract

We consider a modification of the standard two-stage model wherein two high-cost firms conduct cost-reducing R&D, in a setting with spillovers, and then Cournot compete against a low-cost firm that engages in no R&D. Two R&D cooperation scenarios are presented: the R&D cartel and the joint lab. The lagging firms choose a higher R&D level in a cartel, and a fortiori in a joint lab, as compared to R&D competition, and consumer surplus is higher, if and only if the spillover rate is larger than 1/3. The comparisons between firms' profits and social welfare under the three R&D scenarios are also characterized.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ERMES, University Paris 2 in its series Working Papers ERMES with number 0308.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:erm:papers:0308

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References

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  1. De Bondt, Raymond & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1991. "Strategic investment with spillovers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 345-366, October.
  2. Amir, Rabah & Evstigneev, Igor & Wooders, John, 2003. "Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 183-207, February.
  3. Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1998. "Effects of One-way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R&D Cooperation," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  4. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Working Papers 518, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  5. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
  6. Kamien, Morton I & Zang, Israel, 1993. "Competing Research Joint Ventures," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 23-40, Spring.
  7. De Bondt, Raymond & Slaets, Patrick & Cassiman, Bruno, 1992. "The degree of spillovers and the number of rivals for maximum effective R &D," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 35-54, March.
  8. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis, . "Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers," CORE Discussion Papers RP -823, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Amir, Rabah & Wooders, John, 2000. "One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 1-25, April.
  10. Lahiri, Sajal & Ono, Yoshiyasu, 1988. "Helping Minor Firms Reduces Welfare," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(393), pages 1199-1202, December.
  11. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December.
  12. Leyden, Dennis Patrick & Link, Albert N., 1999. "Federal laboratories as research partners," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 575-592, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Gamal Atallah, 2005. "Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation," CIRANO Working Papers 2005s-24, CIRANO.
  2. Lars Wiethaus, 2006. "Cooperation or competition in R&D when innovation and absorption are costly," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(6), pages 569-589.
  3. Andrea Mantovani, 2006. "Complementarity between product and process innovation in a monopoly setting," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 219-234.
  4. Clark, Derek J. & Sand, Jan Yngve, 2009. "Endogenous Technology Sharing in R&D Intensive Industries," Economics Discussion Papers 2009-28, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  5. Marco Marini & Maria Luisa Petit & Roberta Sestini, 2012. "Strategic Timing in R&D Agreements," DIAG Technical Reports 2012-07, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
  6. Raymond De Bondt & Jan Vandekerckhove, 2012. "Reflections on the Relation Between Competition and Innovation," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 7-19, March.

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