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The Role of R&D Technology in Asymmetric Research Joint Ventures

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  • Sami Dakhlia

    (University of Alabama)

  • Flavio M. Menezes

    (Australian National University & EPGE/FGV)

  • Akram Temimi

    (University of Alabama)

Abstract

We characterize asymmetric equilibria in two-stage process innovation games and show that they are prevalent in the different models of R&D technology considered in the literature. Indeed, cooperation in R&D may be accompanied by high concentration in the product market. We show that while such an increase may be profitable, it may be socially inefficient.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/mic/papers/0505/0505003.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0505003.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 12 May 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0505003

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: Research and Development; Research Joint Ventures; Process Innovation Games;

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  1. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis, . "Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers," CORE Discussion Papers RP -823, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Cabral, Luis M. B., 2000. "R&D cooperation and product market competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1033-1047, October.
  3. Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1998. "Effects of One-way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R&D Cooperation," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  4. Ziss, Steffen, 1994. "Strategic R&D with Spillovers, Collusion and Welfare," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(4), pages 375-93, December.
  5. Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1998. "Cooperation vs. competition in R&D: The role of stability of equilibrium," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 63-73, February.
  6. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Asymmetric Contributions to Research Joint Ventures," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 50(2), pages 122-137, 06.
  7. Leahy, Dermot & Neary, J Peter, 1995. "Public Policy Towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries," CEPR Discussion Papers 1243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. De Bondt, Raymond, 1997. "Spillovers and innovative activities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-28, February.
  9. AMIR, Rabah & EVSTIGNEEV, Igor & WOODERS, John, 2001. "Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates," CORE Discussion Papers 2001050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Greg Shaffer & Stephen W. Salant, 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 585-604, June.
  11. De Bondt, Raymond & Slaets, Patrick & Cassiman, Bruno, 1992. "The degree of spillovers and the number of rivals for maximum effective R &D," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 35-54, March.
  12. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-13, CIRANO.
  13. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December.
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