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The Role of R&D Technology in Asymmetric Research Joint Ventures

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Author Info
Sami Dakhlia (University of Alabama)
Flavio M. Menezes (Australian National University & EPGE/FGV)
Akram Temimi (University of Alabama)

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Abstract

We characterize asymmetric equilibria in two-stage process innovation games and show that they are prevalent in the different models of R&D technology considered in the literature. Indeed, cooperation in R&D may be accompanied by high concentration in the product market. We show that while such an increase may be profitable, it may be socially inefficient.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/mic/papers/0505/0505003.pdf
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0505003.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 12 May 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0505003

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Research and Development; Research Joint Ventures; Process Innovation Games;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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  1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-37, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kamien, Morton I & Muller, Eitan & Zang, Israel, 1992. "Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1293-306, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1999. "Effects of One-Way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R & D Cooperation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(2), pages 223-249, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Ziss, Steffen, 1994. "Strategic R&D with Spillovers, Collusion and Welfare," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 375-93, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. De Bondt, Raymond & Slaets, Patrick & Cassiman, Bruno, 1992. "The degree of spillovers and the number of rivals for maximum effective R &D," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 35-54, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. De Bondt, Raymond, 1997. "Spillovers and innovative activities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-28, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Long, Ngo Van & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 505-33, May.
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  8. Rabah Amir, 1998. "Modelling Imperfectly Appropriable R&D via Spillovers," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
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  9. Cabral, Luis M. B., 2000. "R&D cooperation and product market competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1033-1047, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Amir, Rabah & Evstigneev, Igor & Wooders, John, 2003. "Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 183-207, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1998. "Cooperation vs. competition in R&D: The role of stability of equilibrium," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 63-73, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Stephen W. Salant & Greg Shaffer, 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 585-604, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Leahy, Dermot & Neary, J Peter, 1997. "Public Policy towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 642-62, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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