Economic Performance and Political Outcomes: An Analysis of The 1995 Turkish Parliamentary Election Results
Abstract1995 Turkish parliamentary election was held almost under the conditions of a controlled experiment. The unique cross-section data pertaining to this election and the economic and political conditions surrounding it were utilized to study the relationship between the government=s economic performance and the vote shares of political parties. Turkish voters are found to be myopic, not looking back beyond the election year in assessing the government=s economic performance. A good performance is found to benefit the primary incumbent party at the expense of extremist opposition parties and a bad performance is found to benefit extremist opposition parties at the expense of the primary party in power. The junior party in a coalition government and the centrist opposition parties appear to be unaffected by the economic conditions. Evidence found is consistent with a strategic voting by the electorate, to diffuse power and/or to try parties and leaders that were not tried before or last tried a long time ago. These conclusions are essentially in conformity with the literature on other countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economic Research Forum in its series Working Papers with number 0321.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2003
Date of revision: Jul 2003
Publication status: Published by The Economic Research Forum (ERF)
Other versions of this item:
- Ali T. Akarca & Aysit Tansel, 2004. "Economic Performance and Political Outcomes: An Analysis of the 1995 Turkish Parliamentary Election Results," ERC Working Papers 0401, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Jan 2004.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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