The results of twenty-five Turkish elections for parliament and local administrations between 1950 and 2004 are studied. Turkish voters are found to take government's economic performance into account but not look back beyond one year. Furthermore, they are found to hold the major incumbent party responsible for both growth and inflation but minor incumbent parties, only for inflation. Also, they appear to vote strategically, especially in local and parliamentary by elections, to diffuse power. Finally, all parties exhibit a steady depreciation in their political capital while in office. These conclusions are essentially in conformity with the literature on other countries. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 129 (2006) Issue (Month): 1 (October) Pages: 77-105 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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