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Government loan guarantees, market liquidity, and lending standards

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  • Ahnert, Toni
  • Kuncl, Martin

Abstract

We study third-party loan guarantees in a model in which lenders can screen, learn loan quality over time and can sell loans before maturity when in need of liquidity. Loan guarantees improve market liquidity and reduce lending standards, with a positive overall welfare effect. Guarantees improve the average quality of non-guaranteed loans traded and thus the market liquidity of these loans due to both selection and commitment. Because of this positive pecuniary externality, guarantees are insufficient and should be subsidized. Our results contribute to a debate about reforming government-sponsored mortgage guarantees by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

  • Ahnert, Toni & Kuncl, Martin, 2022. "Government loan guarantees, market liquidity, and lending standards," Working Paper Series 2710, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20222710
    Note: 848910
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    Cited by:

    1. Carletti, Elena & Leonello, Agnese & Marquez, Robert, 2023. "Loan guarantees, bank underwriting policies and financial stability," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(2), pages 260-295.
    2. Ahnert, Toni & Kuncl, Martin, 2022. "Government loan guarantees, market liquidity, and lending standards," Working Paper Series 2710, European Central Bank.
    3. Pierri, Nicola & Timmer, Yannick, 2022. "The importance of technology in banking during a crisis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 88-104.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    adverse selection; Government Sponsored Enterprises; market liquidity; mortgage guarantees; pecuniary externality; Pigouvian subsidy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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