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Advertising for attention in a consumer search model

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Author Info

  • Haan, Marco A.

    ()
    (University of Groningen)

  • Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose L.

    (University of Groningen)

Abstract

We model the idea that when consumers search for products, they first visit the firm whose advertising is more salient. The gains a firm derives from being visited early increase in search costs, so equilibrium advertising increases as search costs rise. This may result in lower firm profits when search costs increase. We extend the basic model by allowing for firm heterogeneity in advertising costs. Firms whose advertising is more salient and therefore raise attention more easily charge lower prices in equilibrium and obtain higher profits. As advertising cost asymmetries increase, aggregate profits increase, advertising falls and welfare increases.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by IESE Business School in its series IESE Research Papers with number D/794.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 03 May 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0794

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Postal: IESE Business School, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN
Web page: http://www.iese.edu/
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Keywords: Advertising; attention; consumer search; saliency;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Armstrong, Mark & Zhou, Jidong, 2011. "Paying for prominence," MPRA Paper 30529, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Astorne-Figari, Carmen & Yankelevich, Aleksandr, 2014. "Consumer search with asymmetric price sampling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 331-333.
  3. Zhou, Jidong, 2011. "Multiproduct search," MPRA Paper 37139, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Zhou, Jidong, 2009. "Ordered Search in Differentiated Markets," MPRA Paper 13397, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Alexandre de Cornière, 2013. "Search Advertising," Economics Series Working Papers 649, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  6. Wilson, Chris M., 2010. "Ordered search and equilibrium obfuscation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 496-506, September.
  7. Dmitry Lubensky, 2013. "A Model of Recommended Retail Prices," Working Papers 2013-14, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  8. Chen, Yongmin & Zhang, Tianle, 2013. "Entry and Welfare in Search Markets," MPRA Paper 52241, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Jose L. Moraga-Gonzalez & Vaiva Petrikaite, 2012. "Search Costs, Demand-Side Economies and the Incentives to merge under Bertrand Competition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-017/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  10. Nathan Larson, 2013. "Niche products, generic products, and consumer search," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 793-832, March.
  11. Wilson, Chris M., 2012. "Market frictions: A unified model of search costs and switching costs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1070-1086.

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