AbstractAdvertising messages compete for scarce attention. ?Junk? mail, ?spam? e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message recipients supply attention depending on average message beneÞt. Senders are motivated by proÞts. Costlier message transmission may improve message quality so more messages are examined. Too many messages may be sent, or the wrong ones. A Do-Not-Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs are moderate. The medium is the message with multiple channels, and there is excessive indiscriminate mailing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Virginia, Department of Economics in its series Virginia Economics Online Papers with number 364.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2006
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.virginia.edu/economics/home.html
information overload; congestion; advertising; common property resource; overÞshing; two-sided markets; junk mail; email; telemarketing; Do Not Call List; message pricing; the Medium is the Message; market research.;
Other versions of this item:
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-2006-09-30 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2006-09-30 (Marketing)
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