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Information Congestion Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Simon P. Anderson ()
André de Palma ()
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registered author(s):
Advertising messages compete for scarce attention. ?Junk? mail, ?spam? e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message recipients supply attention depending on average message beneÞt. Senders are motivated by proÞts. Costlier message transmission may improve message quality so more messages are examined. Too many messages may be sent, or the wrong ones. A Do-Not-Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs are moderate. The medium is the message with multiple channels, and there is excessive indiscriminate mailing.
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Paper provided by University of Virginia, Department of Economics in its series Virginia Economics Online Papers with number
364.
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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vir:virpap:364Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.virginia.edu/economics/home.html
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Debby Stanford).
Keywords: information overload ; congestion ; advertising ; common property resource ; overÞshing ; two-sided markets ; junk mail ; email ; telemarketing ; Do Not Call List ; message pricing ; the Medium is the Message ; market research. ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Simon P. Anderson & Regis Renault, 1999.
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Marco A. Haan & José Luis Moraga-González, 2009.
"Advertising for Attention in a Consumer Search Model ,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
09-031/1, Tinbergen Institute.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Khim Yong, Goh & Kai-Lung, Hui & I.P.L. , Png, 2008.
"Social Interaction, Observational Learning, and Privacy: the "Do Not Call" Registry ,"
MPRA Paper
8225, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
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