Information Congestion: open access in a two-sided market
AbstractAdvertising messages compete for scarce attention. “Junk” mail, “spam” e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message recipients supply attention depending on average message benefit, while senders are motivated by profits. Costlier message transmission may improve message quality so more messages are examined. Too many messages may be sent, or the wrong ones. A Do-Not-Call policy beats a ban, but too many individuals opt out. A monopoly gatekeeper performs better than personal access pricing if nuisance costs to receivers are moderate.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2007-10.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 33, boulevard du port - 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex
Phone: 33 1 34 25 60 63
Fax: 33 1 34 25 62 33
Web page: http://thema.u-cergy.fr
More information through EDIRC
information overload; congestion; advertising; common property resource; two-sided markets; junk mail; email; telemarketing; Do Not Call List; message pricing policy.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-04-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2007-04-14 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Timothy Van Zandt, 2004.
"Information Overload in a Network of Targeted Communication,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 542-560, Autumn.
- Van Zandt, Timothy, 2001. "Information Overload in a Network of Targeted Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 2836, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Engers, Maxim & Gans, Joshua S, 1998. "Why Referees Are Not Paid (Enough)," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1341-49, December.
- Anderson, S.P. & Renault, R., 1997.
"Pricing, Product Diversity and Search Costs: A Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model,"
97.481, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Simon P. Anderson & Regis Renault, 1999. "Pricing, Product Diversity, and Search Costs: A Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(4), pages 719-735, Winter.
- Simon P. Anderson & Regis Renault, 1999. "Pricing, product diversity, and search costs: a Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond model," Virginia Economics Online Papers 335, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Simon P. Anderson & Stephen Coate, 2003.
"Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis,"
Virginia Economics Online Papers
358, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Simon P. Anderson & Stephen Coate, 2005. "Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(4), pages 947-972.
- Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
- Willmore, C., 1999. "A Penny for your Thoughts: E-Mail and the Under-Valuation of Expert Time," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 551, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Avinash Dixit & Victor Norman, 1978. "Advertising and Welfare," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 1-17, Spring.
- Chokri Aloui & Khaïreddine Jebsi, 2010. "Optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform with a one-sided congestion effect," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 423-439, December.
- Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John & Zhou, Jidong, 2008.
"Consumer protection and the incentive to become informed,"
9898, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mark Armstrong & John Vickers & Jidong Zhou, 2009. "Consumer Protection and the Incentive to Become Informed," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(2-3), pages 399-410, 04-05.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marion Oury).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.