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Global Analysis of an Expectations Augmented Evolutionary Dynamics

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  • Massimiliano Landi

    (SMU)

Abstract

We consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play. Players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past. We provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategies population game, and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in its series Development Economics Working Papers with number 22463.

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Date of creation: Jan 2007
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Handle: RePEc:eab:develo:22463

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Keywords: evolutionary games; dynamic systems; bounded rationality;

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References

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  1. Roger Lagunoff, 1997. "On the Evolution of Pereto Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9707003, EconWPA.
  2. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
  3. Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1991. "Increasing Returns, Industrialization, and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 617-50, May.
  4. Frankel, David M. & Burdzy, Krzysztof & Pauzner, Ady, 2001. "Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 11923, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  5. Krugman, Paul, 1991. "History versus Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 651-67, May.
  6. John Conlisk, 2001. "Costly Predation and the Distribution of Competence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 475-484, June.
  7. Matsui, Akihiko & Oyama, Daisuke, 2006. "Rationalizable foresight dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 299-322, August.
  8. Peter Diamond & Drew Fudenberg, 1987. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 465, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  9. Angelo Antoci & Pier Sacco, 1995. "A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 89-122, June.
  10. Bischi, Gian Italo & Kopel, Michael, 2001. "Equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive expectations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 73-100, September.
  11. Matsui Akihiko & Matsuyama Kiminori, 1995. "An Approach to Equilibrium Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 415-434, April.
  12. Hommes, Cars H., 1998. "On the consistency of backward-looking expectations: The case of the cobweb," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(3-4), pages 333-362, January.
  13. Hommes, Cars & Sorger, Gerhard, 1998. "Consistent Expectations Equilibria," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(03), pages 287-321, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Pedro, de Mendonça, 2009. "Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties: A Generalized Differential Game Approach with Applications," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 17889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Josephson, Jens, 2009. "Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1543-1554, August.
  3. Oyama, Daisuke, 2006. "Agglomeration under Forward-Looking Expectations: Potentials and Global Stability," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 15239, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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