Threat of a capital levy, expected devaluation and interest rates in France during the interwar period
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to isolate and measure the respective importance of political and economic aspects in two critical episodes of the French interwar period: the stabilization process of the mid-1920s and the reluctance to abandon the gold standard during the 1930s. We do this by separating expectations of taxation and of devaluation that are implicitly included in the prices of various categories of French bonds. About the 1924-26 crisis, we show first that there was no expectation of a government default; second that a substantial part of the high level of interest rate in 1925 can be explained by expectations of a capital levy or other taxation devices; third that hyperinflation was not expected even at the moment of maximum price rise since implied five years interest rate was lower than 20% and since the expected value of the franc was not as low as the spot one. For the 1930s, we show that expectations of a depreciation of the franc explain the rise in interest rates, so that no independent effect of fiscal policy was expected.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number 98-01.
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in European Review of Economic History, III, 1999, pp. 25-56
Other versions of this item:
- Hautcoeur, Pierre-Cyrille & Sicsic, Pierre, 1999. "Threat of a capital levy, expected devaluation and interest rates in France during the interwar period," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(01), pages 25-56, April.
- Hautcoeur, P-C. & Sicsic, P., 1998. "Threat of a Capital Levy, Expected Devaluation and Interest Rates in France during the Interwar Period," Working papers 50, Banque de France.
- E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
- N14 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: 1913-
- N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sicsic, Pierre, 1992. "Was the franc poincare deliberately undervalued?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 69-92, January.
- Baum, Christopher F & Thies, Clifford F, 1992. "On the Construction of Monthly Term Structures of U.S. Interest Rates, 1919-1930," Computer Science in Economics & Management, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 5(3), pages 221-46, August.
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Did nominal interest rates fail to spike during the run on the Franc?
by Jeremie Cohen-Setton in Noahpinion on 2013-10-29 04:29:00
- Michael D. Bordo & Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur, 2003.
"Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One?,"
NBER Working Papers
9860, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael D. Bordo & Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur, 2003. "Why didn't France follow the British Stabilization after World War One ?," DELTA Working Papers 2003-15, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Seghezza, Elena & Morelli, Pierluigi, 2014. "Conflict inflation and delayed stabilization," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 39(PA), pages 171-184.
- Paul Hallwood & Ronald MacDonald & Ian Marsh, 2011. "Remilitarization and the End of the Gold Bloc in 1936," De Economist, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 305-321, September.
- Christoph Farquet, 2012. "The Rise Of The Swiss Tax Haven In The Interwar Period: An International Comparison," Working Papers 0027, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
- Albrecht Ritschl & Tobias Straumann, 2009. "Business cycles and economic policy, 1914-1945: a survey," Economic History Working Papers 22402, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
- Albrecht Ritschl, 2012.
"The German Transfer Problem, 1920-1933: A Sovereign Debt Perspective,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp1155, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Ritschl, Albrecht, 2012. "The German Transfer Problem, 1920-1933: A Sovereign Debt Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 9062, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grande Dépression en France in Wikipedia French ne '')
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