We show that the size of the French public debt, the budget deficit and the monetary overhang made it impossible to stabilize immediately after World War I, even on the anti-keynesian assumption that a stabilization would have had no negative effects on income. The reason for the immediate postwar inflation was then not mismanaged policy but a wise choice in the French context; nevertheless, a stabilization was historically possible from early 1924, and it would likely have benefited not only France but the entire international monetary system.
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Paper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number
2003-15.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Michael Bordo & Barry Eichengreen & Daniela Klingebiel & Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, 2001.
"Is the crisis problem growing more severe?,"
Economic Policy,
CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 51-82, 04.
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