The Capital Levy in Theory and Practice
AbstractThis paper shows how in theory, if the contingencies in response to which it is imposed are fully anticipated, independently verifiable and not under government control, then saving and investment should not fall following the imposition of a capital levy. Nor should the government find it more difficult to raise revenues subsequently, even if its non-recurrence cannot be guaranteed. In practice, however, serious problems stand in the way of implementation. Property owners are sure to delay its adoption and engage in capital flight, reducing the prospective yield and allowing the special circumstances providing the justification for the levy to recede into the past.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 350.
Date of creation: Nov 1989
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Other versions of this item:
- Barry Eichengreen, 1991. "The Capital Levy in Theory and Practice," NBER Working Papers 3096, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eichengreen, Barry, 1989. "The Capital Levy in Theory and Practice," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt11j4756b, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Barry Eichengreen., 1989. "The Capital Levy in Theory and Practice," Economics Working Papers 89-117, University of California at Berkeley.
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