MAULEON, Ana () (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES);UNIVERSITY THE BASQUE COUNTRY (Spain)) VANNETLEBOSCH, Vincent J. (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) ; Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS))
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We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that efficiency wage effects do not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the productivity enhancing effects of paying higher wages are sufficiently large, then efficiency wage effects still increase the wage of equilibrium. More surprisingly, we show that efficiency wage effects increase the strike activity.
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