This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Curb Your Innovation: Corporate Conservatism in the Presence of Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Baccara, Mariagiovanna
Razin, Ronny

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this Paper we analyse the effects of information leakage on the incentives to innovate in firms. We analyse a situation in which an employee in a firm is inspired with a new idea for a product. In a framework in which Intellectual Property Rights on ideas are absent, we analyse the employee’s decision of whether to disclose the idea within the firm or to form a spin-out. We next look at the shareholders of the original firm and analyse their incentives to promote creativity and innovations among employees. Our analysis highlights the effects of the distribution of shares within the firm and the firm’s size on the incentives and behaviour of firms towards innovation. In particular we highlight the following findings. (i) Often employees may not implement an idea either within or outside the firm. (ii) The ownership structure affects the incentives to promote innovation in firms. (iii) Firm shareholders may have incentives to curtail innovation even if these innovations are expected to be revealed within the firm. (iv) Firms may buy-off potential innovative agents, by providing them with compensation plans that dominate leaving the firm, or revealing new ideas within the firm. (v) Information leakage concerns affect both the hiring and the information provision decisions of the firm.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4466.asp
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4466.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4466

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: corporate governance information leakage innovation spin-outs

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Chari, V V & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 1991. "Vintage Human Capital, Growth, and the Diffusion of New Technology," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1142-65, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Ariel Pakes & Shmuel Nitzan, 1982. "Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of "Rival" Enterprises," NBER Working Papers 0871, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David, 2002. "Perfectly Competitive Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Jeremy C. Stein, 2000. "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms," NBER Working Papers 7705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Boyan Jovanovic & Glenn MacDonald, 1994. "Competitive Diffusion," NBER Working Papers 4463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1995. "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 20-33, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. J·n Z·bojnÌk, 2002. "A Theory of Trade Secrets in Firms," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 831-855, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. April Mitchell Franco & Darren Filson, 2000. "Knowledge diffusion through employee mobility," Staff Report 272, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Krishna B. Kumar & Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, . "What Determines Firm Size?," CRSP working papers 496, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Besen, Stanley M & Raskind, Leo J, 1991. "An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 3-27, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/478, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Lee, Tom & Wilde, Louis L, 1980. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(2), pages 429-36, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1994. "Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 190-209, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K., 2004. "Rent-seeking and innovation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 127-160, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Loury, Glenn C, 1979. "Market Structure and Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(3), pages 395-410, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Management of Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1185-1209, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Nancy T. Gallini, 1992. "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 52-63, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Ordover, Janusz A, 1991. "A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 43-60, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Edward L. Glaeser & Hedi D. Kallal & Jose A. Scheinkman & Andrei Shleifer, 1991. "Growth in Cities," NBER Working Papers 3787, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Glaeser, Edward L & Hedi D. Kallal & Jose A. Scheinkman & Andrei Shleifer, 1992. "Growth in Cities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1126-52, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1995. "Start-ups, Spin-offs, and Internal Projects," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 362-78, October.
  22. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Ronny Razin, 2003. "From Thought to Practice: Appropriation and Endogenous Market Structure with Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights," Working Papers 03-11, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  23. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 2002. "The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 69(3), pages 513-31, July.
  24. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms," NBER Working Papers 7546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  25. Klepper, Steven, 2001. "Employee Startups in High-Tech Industries," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(3), pages 639-74, September.
  26. Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 1891-1921, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Schivardi, Fabiano & Schneider, Martin, 2005. "Strategic Experimentation and Disruptive Technological Change," CEPR Discussion Papers 4925, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  28. Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, 1980. "Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 1-28, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marimon, Ramon & Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2006. "Competition, Innovation and Growth with Limited Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 5840, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Luca Colombo & Herbert Dawid, 2008. "Complementary Assets, Start-Ups and Incentives to Innovate," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0080, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE). [Downloadable!]
  3. Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2008. "Competition, Human Capital and Income Inequality with Limited Commitment," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/21, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors can create their own profile with links to their works on the RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-19.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.