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Competition, Innovation and Growth with Limited Commitment

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  • Marimon, Ramon
  • Quadrini, Vincenzo

Abstract

We study how barriers to competition - such as, restrictions to business start-up and strict enforcement of covenants or IPR - affect the investment in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. These barriers lower the competition for human capital and reduce the incentive to accumulate knowledge. We show in a dynamic general equilibrium model that this mechanism has the potential to account for significant cross-country income inequality.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5840.

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Date of creation: Sep 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5840

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Keywords: contract enforcement; economic growth; human capital;

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References

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  1. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988. "On the mechanics of economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July.
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  3. Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2003. "Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability," Working Papers 1, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Albert Marcet & Ramon Marimon, 2011. "Recursive Contracts," CEP Discussion Papers dp1055, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  5. Acemoglu, Daron & Aghion, Philippe & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2002. "Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 3467, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Stephen L. Parente & Edward C. Prescott, 2002. "Barriers to Riches," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661306, December.
  7. Paul Romer, 1989. "Endogenous Technological Change," NBER Working Papers 3210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Boyan Jovanovic, 2004. "The Product Cycle and Inequality," NBER Working Papers 10910, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Philippe Aghion & Nicholas Bloom & Richard Blundell & Rachel Griffith & Peter Howitt, 2002. "Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship," NBER Working Papers 9269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2008. "Against Intellectual Monopoly," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002371, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Acemoglu, Daron, 1997. "Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 445-64, July.
  12. Kocherlakota, Narayana R, 1996. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609, October.
  13. Ananth Seshadri & Rodolfo Manuelli, 2005. "Human Capital and the Wealth of Nations," 2005 Meeting Papers 56, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  14. Marcet, Albert & Marimon, Ramon, 1992. "Communication, commitment, and growth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 219-249, December.
  15. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1998. "Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions," Working papers 98-14, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  16. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Razin, Ronny, 2004. "Curb Your Innovation: Corporate Conservatism in the Presence of Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 4466, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Jones, Charles I, 1995. "R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 759-84, August.
  18. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1994. "Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 190-209, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Hernan J. Moscoso Boedo & Toshihiko Mukoyama, 2011. "Evaluating the Effects of Entry Regulations and Firing Costs on International Income Differences," Virginia Economics Online Papers 379, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  2. Simon Commander & Zlatko Nikoloski, 2010. "Institutions and economic performance: What can be explained?," Working Papers 121, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chief Economist.
  3. Messner Matthias & Pavoni Nicola & Sleet Christopher, . "On the Dual Approach to Recursive Optimization," GSIA Working Papers 2012-E12, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.

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