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Aid Effectiveness and Limited Enforceable Conditionality

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Author Info
Almuth Scholl

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Abstract

This paper analyzes optimal foreign aid policy in a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient government. Aid conditionality is modelled as a limited enforceable contract. We define conditional aid policy to be self-enforcing if, at any point in time, the conditions imposed on aid funds are supportable by the threat of a permanent aid cutoff from then onward. Quantitative results show that the effectiveness of unconditional aid is low while self-enforcing conditional aid strongly stimulates the economy. However, increasing the welfare of the poor comes at high cost: to ensure aid effectiveness, less democratic political regimes receive permanently larger aid funds.

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Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany in its series SFB 649 Discussion Papers with number SFB649DP2005-054.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision: Aug 2005
Handle: RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2005-054

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical
F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Yasemin Boztug & Lutz Hildebrandt, 2005. "An empirical test of theories of price valuation using a semiparametric approach, reference prices, and accounting for heterogeneity," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2005-057, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Christian Weiner, 2005. "The Impact of Industry Classification Schemes on Financial Research," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2005-062, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Wolfgang Härdle & Sigbert Klinke & Uwe Ziegenhagen, 2005. "Integrable e-lements for Statistics Education," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2005-058, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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