Aid Conditionality and Military Expenditure Reduction in Developing Countries: Models of Asymmetric Information
AbstractThis paper analyzes problems of implementing noneconomic conditionality, such as military expenditure reduction, in the granting of foreign aid given the presence of asymmetric information. The authors present two conceptually separate principal-agent models to capture the stylized facts of multilateral and bilateral aid negotiations respectively. The first model is an application of the problem of adverse selection when there is more than one type of principal (donor) with varying objectives. The second model extends moral hazard to double moral hazard, where neither principal nor agent (recipient) can fully observe or verify each other's strategies. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 105 (1995)
Issue (Month): 429 (March)
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