Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Explaining the Allocation of Bilateral and Multilateral Environmental Aid to Developing Countries

Contents:

Author Info

  • Hicks, Robert L.
  • Parks, Bradley C.
  • Tierney, Michael J.

Abstract

In this paper we examine how international development assistance for environmental purposes is allocated to developing countries. In particular, we investigate whether there are patterned differences between environmental aid for international public goods projects versus environmental projects having more localized impacts. We empirically investigate these questions using project project level development assistance data.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19346
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI with number 19346.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea05:19346

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1100, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Email:
Web page: http://www.aaea.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: International Development;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. William Easterly, 2003. "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 23-48, Summer.
  2. Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J., 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(02), pages 241-276, March.
  3. Isham, Jonathan & Kaufmann, Daniel & Pritchett, Lant H, 1997. "Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 11(2), pages 219-42, May.
  4. Patrick GUILLAUMONT & Lisa CHAUVET, 1999. "Aid and Performance: A Reassessment," Working Papers 199910, CERDI.
  5. Gould, Erica R., 2003. "Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(03), pages 551-586, June.
  6. Tammy L. Lewis, 2003. "Environmental Aid: Driven by Recipient Need or Donor Interests?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 84(1), pages 144-161.
  7. Burnside, Craig & Dollar, David, 1998. "Aid, the incentive regime, and poverty reduction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1937, The World Bank.
  8. Dollar, David & Svensson, Jakob, 1998. "What explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programs?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1938, The World Bank.
  9. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 2000. "The catalyzing role of policy-based lending by the IMF and the World Bank: fact or fiction?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(7), pages 951-973.
  10. Boone, Peter, 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 289-329, February.
  11. Anne O. Krueger, 1997. "Whither the World Bank and the IMF?," NBER Working Papers 6327, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Isham, Jonathan & Kaufmann,Daniel, 1995. "The forgotten rationale for policy reform : the productivity of investment projects," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1549, The World Bank.
  13. Graham Bird & Dane Rowlands, 1997. "The Catalytic Effect of Lending by the International Financial Institutions," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(7), pages 967-991, November.
  14. Shavell, Steven, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-62, November.
  15. William Easterly & Ross Levine & David Roodman, 2003. "New Data, New doubts: A Comment on Burnside and Dollar's "Aid, Policies, and Growth" (2000)," NBER Working Papers 9846, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Collier, Paul & Dollar, David, 2002. "Aid allocation and poverty reduction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1475-1500, September.
  17. Collier, Paul & Dollar, David, 2001. "Can the World Cut Poverty in Half? How Policy Reform and Effective Aid Can Meet International Development Goals," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1787-1802, November.
  18. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Scholarly Articles 3450061, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  19. Devesh Kapur, 2001. "Expansive agendas and weak instruments: governance related conditionalities of international financial institutions," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 207-241.
  20. Dollar, David & Alesina, Alberto, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Scholarly Articles 4553020, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  21. Kapur, Devesh, 2002. "The Common Pool Dilemma of Global Public Goods: Lessons from the World Bank's Net Income and Reserves," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 337-354, March.
  22. Hansen, Henrik & Tarp, Finn, 2001. "Aid and growth regressions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 547-570, April.
  23. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
  24. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "Foreign aid and rent-seeking," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 437-461, August.
  25. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-84, February.
  26. Azam, Jean-Paul & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Contracting for aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 25-58, February.
  27. Bertin Martens, 2005. "Why Do Aid Agencies Exist?," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 23(6), pages 643-663, November.
  28. Kaul, Inge & Conceicao, Pedro & Le Goulven, Katell & Mendoza, Ronald U. (ed.), 2003. "Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195157413, September.
  29. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-77, Fall.
  30. Martens,Bertin & Mummert,Uwe & Murrell,Peter & Seabright,Paul, 2002. "The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808187, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aaea05:19346. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.