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How should donors give foreign aid? Project aid versus budget support

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Author Info
Izabela Jelovac () (GATE, University of Lyon, CNRS, ENS-LSH, Centre Léon Bérard, France)
Frieda Vandeninden () (MGSoG, Universiteit Maastricht)

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Abstract

We develop a theoretical model to compare the two major foreign aid modalities: project aid and budget support. These two modalities have a different impact on the production of ‘developmental goods’. Firstly, conditionality can be associated with budget support, but only a subset of the developmental expenses – the observable ones – can be subject to conditionality. Secondly, when using project aid, the donors control the overall allocation of the aid resources. However, we consider that, because of limited harmonisation and coordination, project aid can be associated with a cost of imperfect fit. We develop a unified framework to compare these two modalities where we allow the simultaneous utilisation of both instruments. We show that all the aid should be given via budget support, no matter whether conditionality is used or not. Furthermore, we show that the optimal use of conditionality depends on the recipient’s developmental preferences, the productivity of the inputs and the level of aid compared to the recipient’s budget: when these parameters are relatively high, conditionality should be enforced. Otherwise, the optimal aid allocation is such that all the aid is given through unconditional budget support. We conclude that conditionality does not always improve the aid effectiveness.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure in its series Working Papers with number 0813.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:0813

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Related research
Keywords: conditionality; foreign aid; optimal contract;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Tarp, Finn, 2006. "Aid and Development," MPRA Paper 13171, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "Foreign aid and rent-seeking," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 437-461, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Craig Burnside & David Dollar, 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 847-868, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Raghuram Rajan & Arvind Subramanian, 2005. "What Undermines Aid's Impact on Growth?," IMF Working Papers 05/126, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Azam, Jean-Paul & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Contracting for aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 25-58, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Tito Cordella & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, 2007. "Budget Support Versus Project Aid: A Theoretical Appraisal," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(523), pages 1260-1279, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. William Easterly, 2003. "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 23-48, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Boone, Peter, 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 289-329, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Collier, Paul & Dollar, David, 2002. "Aid allocation and poverty reduction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1475-1500, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 381-402, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Hansen, Henrik & Tarp, Finn, 2001. "Aid and growth regressions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 547-570, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Carsten Hefeker, 2006. "Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions," Review of Development Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 241-252, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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