What explains the changes in International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality? I argue that IMF conditionality agreements are influenced by supplementary financiers. The IMF regularly relies on external financing to supplement its loans to countries facing payments imbalances. As a result, these supplementary financiers are able to exercise leverage over the IMF and the design of its conditionality programs. I consider the influence of one type of supplementary financier, private financial institutions, on IMF conditionality. Conclusions are supported by a data set of 249 conditionality arrangements, coded according to their terms, and two case studies. Many thanks to Judy Goldstein, Steve Krasner, and Tom Willett for reading multiple versions of this article and providing incisive, constructive comments each time. I am also grateful to David Andrews, Timothy Bei, Stephen Haber, Peter Henry, Simon Jackman, Jeff Legro, Lisa Martin, John Owen, Louis Pauly, Herman Schwartz, Jim Vreeland, and two external reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Errors are entirely my own. Many thanks also to the staff of the International Monetary Fund archives who generously assisted me in my research. I also gratefully acknowledge support from the University of Virginia and the following Stanford University sources: the Graduate School of Business, the Graduate Research Opportunity program, the Admiral and Mrs. John E. Lee Fund of the Social Science History Institute, and the O Bie Schultz Fellowship in International Studies from the Institute for International Studies.
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Thomas Barnebeck Andersen & Thomas Harr & Finn Tarp, 2004.
"On US politics and IMF Lending,"
Discussion Papers
04-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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