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Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of "Rival" Enterprises

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  • Ariel Pakes
  • Shmuel Nitzan

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of hiring scientists for research and development projects when one takes explicit account of the fact that the scientist may be able to use the information acquired during the project in a rival enterprise. Management's problem is to determine an optimum labor policy for its project. The policy consists of an employment decision and a labor contract. Given optimum behavior, it is straightforward to analyze the effect of the potential for mobility of scientific personnel on project profitability and on research employment. We also formalize conditions under which one would expect to observe a scientist leaving his employer to set up (or join) a rival.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 0871.

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Date of creation: Mar 1982
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Publication status: published as Pakes, Ariel and Shmuel Nitzan. "Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of "Rival" Enterprises." Journalof Labor Economics, Vol. 1, No. 4, (October 1983), pp. 345-365.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:0871

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  1. Richard R. Nelson, 1959. "The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67, pages 297.
  2. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 219-55, April.
  3. Dale T. Mortensen, 1978. "Specific Capital and Labor Turnover," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 572-586, Autumn.
  4. Peter Temin, 1979. "Technology, Regulation, and Market Structure in the Modern Pharmaceutical Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(2), pages 429-446, Autumn.
  5. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-84, December.
  6. Joanne Salop & Steve Salop, 1976. "Self-selection and turnover in the labor market," Special Studies Papers, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) 80, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  7. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Gaskins, Darius Jr., 1971. "Dynamic limit pricing: Optimal pricing under threat of entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 306-322, September.
  9. Salop, Joanne & Salop, Steven, 1976. "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 619-27, November.
  10. A. Michael Spence, 1975. "The Economics of Internal Organization: An Introduction," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(1), pages 163-172, Spring.
  11. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
  12. Nickell, Stephen J, 1976. "Wage Structures and Quit Rates," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 17(1), pages 191-203, February.
  13. Akerlof, George A, 1976. "The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-617, November.
  14. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-39, May.
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