Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of "Rival" Enterprises
AbstractThis paper considers the problem of hiring scientists for research and development projects when one takes explicit account of the fact that the scientist may be able to use the information acquired during the project in a rival enterprise. Management's problem is to determine an optimum labor policy for its project. The policy consists of an employment decision and a labor contract. Given optimum behavior, it is straightforward to analyze the effect of the potential for mobility of scientific personnel on project profitability and on research employment. We also formalize conditions under which one would expect to observe a scientist leaving his employer to set up (or join) a rival.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.
Volume (Year): 1 (1983)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/
Other versions of this item:
- Pakes, Ariel & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1983. "Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of "Rival" Enterprises," Scholarly Articles 3428538, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Ariel Pakes & Shmuel Nitzan, 1982. "Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of "Rival" Enterprises," NBER Working Papers 0871, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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