This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Rent-seeking and innovation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Michele Boldrin
David K. Levine

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development. Innovations are less socially useful, but more profitable for the innovator, when they are adopted slowly and the innovator remains a monopolist. For this reason, rent-seeking, both public and private, plays an important role in determining the social usefulness of innovations. This paper examines the political economy of intellectual property, analyzing the trade-off between private and public rent-seeking. While it is true in principle that public rent-seeking may be a substitute for private rent-seeking, it is not true that this results always either in less private rent-seeking or in a welfare improvement. When the public sector itself is selfish and behaves rationally, we may experience the worst of public and private rent-seeking together.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr347.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Staff Report with number 347.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmsr:347

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 90 Hennepin Avenue, P.O. Box 291, Minneapolis, MN 55480-0291
Phone: (612) 204-5000
Web page: http://minneapolisfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

Related research
Keywords: Rent (Economic theory) Technological innovations Intellectual property

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko, 1999. "A Voluntary Participation Game with a Non-excludable Public Good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 227-242, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Ritter, Jay R, 1983. "Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(2), pages 331-46, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2002. "The Case Against Intellectual Property," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000003, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," Industrial Organization 0201004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1994. "Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 190-209, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. James Bessen & Eric Maskin, 2006. "Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation," Economics Working Papers 0025, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2002. "Perfectly Competitive Innovation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000192, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn M & Slivinski, Alan, 1985. "Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 837-58, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1991. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 29-41, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Serguey Braguinsky & Salavat Gabdrakhmanov & Atsushi Ohyama, 2007. "A Theory of Competitive Industry Dynamics With Innovation and Imitation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(4), pages 729-760, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Franco Cugno & Elisabetta Ottoz, 2007. "Trade Secret vs. Broad Patent: The Role of Licensing," Review of Law & Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(2), pages 3. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2005. "IP and Market Size," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000836, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2005. "The economics of ideas and intellectual property," Staff Report 357, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2006. "Growth and Intellectual Property," NBER Working Papers 12769, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2005. "Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Creation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000925, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Ronny Razin, 2004. "Curb Your Innovation: Corporate Conservatism in the Presence of Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000194, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are NEP reports in over 80 fields that deliver new research to your email.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-29.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.