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Rent-seeking and innovation

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  • Boldrin, Michele
  • Levine, David K.

Abstract

Innovations and their adoption are the keys to growth and development. Innovations are less socially useful, but more profitable for the innovator, when they are adopted slowly and the innovator remains a monopolist. For this reason, rent-seeking, both public and private, plays an important role in determining the social usefulness of innovations. This paper examines the political economy of intellectual property, analyzing the trade-off between private and public rent-seeking. While it is true in principle that public rent-seeking may be a substitute for private rent-seeking, it is not true that this results always either in less private rent-seeking or in a welfare improvement. When the public sector itself is selfish and behaves rationally, we may experience the worst of public and private rent-seeking together.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 51 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 127-160

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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:51:y:2004:i:1:p:127-160

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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References

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  1. Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47, January.
  2. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2002. "The Case Against Intellectual Property," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000003, David K. Levine.
  3. Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K., 2008. "Perfectly competitive innovation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 435-453, April.
  4. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1994. "Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 190-209, March.
  5. Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," NBER Working Papers 9114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Yamato, Takehiko, 1999. "A Voluntary Participation Game with a Non-excludable Public Good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 227-242, February.
  7. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Ritter, Jay R, 1983. "Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 331-46, April.
  8. Carlos Ponce, 2003. "Knowledge Disclosure as Intellectual Property Rights Protection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000550, David K. Levine.
  9. James Bessen & Eric Maskin, 2006. "Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation," Economics Working Papers 0025, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  10. Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn M & Slivinski, Alan, 1985. "Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 837-58, October.
  11. Suzanne Scotchmer, 1991. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 29-41, Winter.
  12. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Serguey Braguinsky & Salavat Gabdrakhmanov & Atsushi Ohyama, 2007. "A Theory of Competitive Industry Dynamics With Innovation and Imitation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(4), pages 729-760, October.
  2. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2010. "Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000028, David K. Levine.
  3. Giacomo Ponzetto, 2012. "Intellectual Property Rights and Efficient Firm Organization," Working Papers 668, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Ronny Razin, 2004. "Curb Your Innovation: Corporate Conservatism in the Presence of Imperfect Intellectual Property Rights," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000194, David K. Levine.
  5. Bessen, James, 2005. "Patents and the diffusion of technical information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 121-128, January.
  6. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2005. "IP and Market Size," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000836, David K. Levine.
  7. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2005. "The economics of ideas and intellectual property," Staff Report 357, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  8. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2009. "Market Size And Intellectual Property Protection," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(3), pages 855-881, 08.
  9. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2005. "Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Creation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000925, David K. Levine.
  10. Ronny Razin & Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2008. "Bargaining Over New Ideas: Rent Distribution and Stability of Innovative Firms," Working Papers 08-6, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  11. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2006. "Growth and Intellectual Property," NBER Working Papers 12769, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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