The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties

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The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties

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Suzanne Scotchmer (NBER & University of California, Berkeley)

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Suzanne Scotchmer

Abstract

Intellectual property treaties have two main types of provisions: national treatment of foreign inventors, and harmonization of protections. I characterize the circumstances in which countries would want to treat foreign inventors the same as national inventors. I then argue that national treatment of foreign inventors leads to stronger intellectual property protection than is optimal, and that this effect is exacerbated when protections must be harmonized. However levels of public and private R&D spending will be lower than if each country took account of the uncompensated externalities that its R&D spending confers on other countries. The stronger protections engendered by attempts at harmonization are a partial remedy.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 0201004.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 04 Jan 2002
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0201004

Note: 33 pages, Acrobat .pdf
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Paper
- Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," NBER Working Papers 9114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Suzanne Scotchmer., 2001. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," Economics Working Papers E01-305, University of California at Berkeley.
- Suzanne Scotchmer, 2001. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series CPC01-24, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F1 - International Economics - - Trade
L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2002-01-22 (All new papers)
NEP-INO-2002-01-22 (Innovation)
NEP-POL-2002-01-22 (Positive Political Economics)
NEP-TID-2002-01-22 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Spencer, Barbara J & Brander, James A, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 707-22, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Working Papers 518, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," NBER Working Papers 1192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "An Economic Theory of GATT," NBER Working Papers 6049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Moschini, Giancarlo, 2003. "Intellectual Property Rights and the World Trade Organization: Retrospect and Prospects," Staff General Research Papers 10442, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- GianCarlo Moschini, 2003. "Intellectual Property Rights and the World Trade Organization: Retrospect and Prospects," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 03-wp334, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
Grossman, Gene & Lai, Edwin, 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," CEPR Discussion Papers 3118, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Grossman, G.M. & Lai, E., 2001. "International Protection of intellectual Property," Papers 215, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, Gene M. & Lai, Edwin L.-C., 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
- Gene Grossman & Edwin L.-C. Lai, 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," NBER Working Papers 8704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sumner J La Croix & Denise Eby Konan, 2006. "Have Developing Countries Gained From the Marriage Between Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property Rights?," Working Papers 200605, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2003. "Rent Seeking and Innovation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000465, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Michele Boldrin, 2003. "Rent Seeking and Innovation," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000063, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2004. "Rent-seeking and innovation," Staff Report 347, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
- Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David K., 2004. "Rent-seeking and innovation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 127-160, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lewis Evans and Patrick Hughes, 2003. "Competition Policy in Small Distant Open Economies: Some Lessons from the Economics Literature," Treasury Working Paper Series 03/31, New Zealand Treasury. [Downloadable!]
Josh Lerner, 2002. "Patent Protection and Innovation Over 150 Years," NBER Working Papers 8977, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gene M. Grossman & Edwin L.-C.Lai, 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," Governance Working Papers 188, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 2004. "The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law: An Economic Approach," Economics Discussion Papers 581, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Gene M Grossman & Edwin L Lai, 2004. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000442, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Suzanne Scotchmer, 2003. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1084, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
Wilfred J. Ethier, 2003. "TRIPS, externalities, trade agreements, hostages," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-034, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]

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