The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties
AbstractIntellectual property treaties have two main types of provisions: national treatment of foreign inventors, and harmonization of protections. I characterize the circumstances in which countries would want to treat foreign inventors the same as national inventors. I then argue that national treatment of foreign inventors leads to stronger intellectual property protection than is optimal, and that this effect is exacerbated when protections must be harmonized. However levels of public and private R&D spending will be lower than if each country took account of the uncompensated externalities that its R&D spending confers on other countries. The stronger protections engendered by attempts at harmonization are a partial remedy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 0201004.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 04 Jan 2002
Date of revision:
Note: 33 pages, Acrobat .pdf
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Other versions of this item:
- Suzanne Scotchmer, 2004. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 415-437, October.
- Suzanne Scotchmer, 2003. "The political economy of intellectual property treaties," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov.
- Suzanne Scotchmer., 2001. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," Economics Working Papers E01-305, University of California at Berkeley.
- Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," NBER Working Papers 9114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-01-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-INO-2002-01-22 (Innovation)
- NEP-POL-2002-01-22 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-TID-2002-01-22 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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6049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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