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A Simple Model Of Nepotism

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  • Michela Ponzo

    ()

  • Vincenzo Scoppa

    ()
    (Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica, Università della Calabria)

Abstract

This paper analyses theoretically favouritism in recruitment decisions. We study the investments in connections by applicants for jobs which pay a wage rent and the behaviour of public or private managers intending to favour the recruitment of connected agents in place of more competent candidates. Key elements in determining favouritism are the delegation of recruitment decisions and unverifiable information regarding the skills of job applicants. We show in an agency framework that if the manager is “corruptible”, both low and high ability workers invest in connections and that nepotism is more widespread in jobs paying high wage-rents; in organisations in which “low-powered incentives” are used for managers; when firm performance is slightly sensitive to abilities; when it is easy to make hidden payments and the intensity of family ties is strong; when the uncertainty of connection process is low.

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File URL: http://www.ecostat.unical.it/RePEc/WorkingPapers/WP17_2010.pdf
File Function: First version, 2010-10
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza (Ex Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica) in its series Working Papers with number 201017.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:clb:wpaper:201017

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza, Ponte Pietro Bucci, Cubo 0/C, I-87036 Arcavacata di Rende, CS, Italy
Phone: +39 0984 492413
Fax: +39 0984 492421
Web page: http://www.unical.it/portale/strutture/dipartimenti_240/disesf/
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Related research

Keywords: Recruitment policies; Favouritism; Nepotism; Connections; Incentives;

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Cited by:
  1. Ponzo, Michela & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2009. "The Use of Informal Networks in Italy: Efficiency or Favoritism?," MPRA Paper 17281, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Ponzo, Michela & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2008. "The Use of Informal Networks in Italian Labor Markets: Efficiency or Favoritisms?," MPRA Paper 11764, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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