Note: Using the Emergent Seed to Completely Characterize 'Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game'
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 784828000000000142.
Date of creation: 24 Jun 2005
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-03-18 (All new papers)
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- Johnson, Philip & Levine, David K. & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2001.
"Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 1-21, September.
- Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Ellison, G., 1996. "Basins of Attraction, Long Run Equilibria, and the Speed of Step-by- Step Evolution," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 96-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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