Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior

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Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior

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Dirk Schindler ()
Guttorm Schjelderup ()

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Abstract

We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1702.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1702

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Paper
- Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2006. "Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior," CoFE Discussion Paper 06-01, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ACC-2006-06-03 (Accounting & Auditing)
NEP-ALL-2006-06-03 (All new papers)
NEP-EEC-2006-06-03 (European Economics)
NEP-PBE-2006-06-03 (Public Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
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