Trade Liberalization and Cartel Stability
AbstractCan reduced trade barriers promote a collusive understanding about not exporting into each others domestic markets? Reduced trade costs increase the short-run gains from starting exporting, but can also make the long-run punishment of such a strategy harsher. If collusion on prices is supported by a trigger strategy, a reduction in trade costs weakens competition in the sense that collusion is easier to sustain. In a corresponding model with collusion on quantities, this conclusion is reversed. The authors also discuss how results change if grim trigger strategies are replaced by stick-and-carrot punishments. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of International Economics.
Volume (Year): 9 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576
Other versions of this item:
- Lommerund, K.E. & Sorgard, L., 1998. "Trade Liberalization and Cartel Stability," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0198, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2006.
"Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior,"
CoFE Discussion Paper
06-01, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz.
- Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2006. "Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior," CESifo Working Paper Series 1702, CESifo Group Munich.
- Akinbosoye, Osayi & Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2012. "On the stability of multimarket collusion in price-setting supergames," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 253-264.
- Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2004. "Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 577-600, March.
- Switgard Feuerstein, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 163-198, December.
- Philipp J. H. Schröder, 2007.
"Cartel Stability and Economic Integration,"
Review of International Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 313-320, 05.
- Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sørgard, Lars, 2002.
"Entry in Telecommunication: Customer Loyalty, Price Sensitivity and Access Prices,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3502, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sorgard, Lars, 2003. "Entry in telecommunication: customer loyalty, price sensitivity and access prices," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 55-72, March.
- Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sørgard, Lars, 2002. "Entry in Telecommunication: Customer Loyalty, Price Sensitivity and Access Prices," Working Papers in Economics 14/02, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Peter Neary & Dermot Leahy, 2010.
"Oligopoly and Trade,"
Economics Series Working Papers
517, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Dermot Leahy & J. Peter Neary, 2010. "Oligopoly And Trade," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n215-10.pdf, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
- Leahy, Dermot & Neary, J Peter, 2010. "Oligopoly and Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 8172, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andreas Haufler & Guttorm Schielderup, 1999.
"Tacit Collusion under Destination - and Origin-Based Commodity Taxation,"
CoFE Discussion Paper
99-17, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz.
- Andreas Haufler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2000. "Tacit Collusion under Destination- and Origin-Based Commodity Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 283, CESifo Group Munich.
- Haufler, A. & Schjelderup, G., 1999. "Tacit Collusion under Destination- and Origin-Based Commodity Taxation," Papers 8/99, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
- Straume, O.R., 1999.
"Union Collusion and Intra-Industry Trade,"
Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen
1399, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2012. "Economic integration and the sustainability of multimarket collusion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 42-44.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.