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Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior

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Author Info
DIRK SCHINDLER
GUTTORM SCHJELDERUP

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Abstract

We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard. Copyright © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01422.x
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Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
Pages: 599-621
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:11:y:2009:i:4:p:599-621

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  4. Steen, Frode & Sorgard, Lars, 1999. "Semicollusion in the Norwegian cement market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(9), pages 1775-1796, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Keen, Michael, 1987. "Welfare effects of commodity tax harmonisation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 107-114, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2004. "Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 577-600, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Froot, Kenneth A & Klemperer, Paul D, 1989. "Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market Share Matters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 637-54, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Jack Mintz, 2004. "Corporate Tax Harmonization in Europe: It's All About Compliance," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 221-234, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Haufler, A. & Schjelderup, G., 1999. "Tacit Collusion under Destination- and Origin-Based Commodity Taxation," Papers 8/99, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
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  10. Pinto, Brian, 1986. "Repeated games and the reciprocal dumping model of trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3-4), pages 357-366, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1989. "Tariffs vs Quotas with Implicit Collusion," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 237-44, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Mintz, Jack & Tulkens, Henry, 1986. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-172, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Michael Keen & Sajal Lahiri & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, . "When is Policy Harmonisation Desirable?," EPRU Working Paper Series 98-02, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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