IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecorec/v73y1997i222p270-284.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

National Competition Policy

Author

Listed:
  • STEPHEN P. KING

Abstract

National competition policy is having a major effect on Australian industry. The Hilmer committee recommendations on infrastructure access, competitive neutrality, restructuring of public enterprises and legislative review have been accepted by all Australian governments. The underlying economic principles, however, are not necessarily reflected in the reforms. The process of negotiated infrastructure access established under national competition policy may lead to monopoly rather than competitive pricing. Structural reforms of government business enterprises have ignored the benefits of integration and the relevant market characteristics. Legislative review has resulted in considerable political controversy. In some cases, competition policy can be improved by simple amendments to legislation while in other cases a clearer understanding of the relevant trade‐offs may improve the reform process.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen P. King, 1997. "National Competition Policy," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 73(222), pages 270-284, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:73:y:1997:i:222:p:270-284
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.1997.tb01000.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.1997.tb01000.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1475-4932.1997.tb01000.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Access pricing and competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1673-1710, December.
    2. Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(1990 Micr), pages 205-286.
    3. Perry, Martin K., 1989. "Vertical integration: Determinants and effects," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 183-255, Elsevier.
    4. John Quiggin, 1994. "The Fiscal Gains from Contracting Out: Transfers or Efficiency Improvements," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 27(3), pages 97-102, July.
    5. Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, 1995. "Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the Efficient Component Pricing Rule?," Working Papers 95-04, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    6. Lieberman, Marvin B, 1991. "Determinants of Vertical Integration: An Empirical Test," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 451-466, September.
    7. Forsyth, P., 1992. "Public Enterprises: A Success Story of Microeconomic Reform?," CEPR Discussion Papers 278, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    8. David E.M. Sappington & David S. Sibley, 1992. "Strategic Nonlinear Pricing under Price-Cap Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    9. Kaserman, David L & Mayo, John W, 1991. "The Measurement of Vertical Economies and the Efficient Structure of the Electric Utility Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 483-502, September.
    10. Hausman, Jerry & Tardiff, Timothy & Belinfante, Alexander, 1993. "The Effects of the Breakup of AT&T on Telephone Penetration in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 178-184, May.
    11. Jeff Borland, 1994. "On Contracting Out: Some Labour Market Considerations," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 27(3), pages 86-90, July.
    12. Richard J. Gilbert & Michael H. Riordan, 1995. "Regulating Complementary Products: A Comparative Institutional Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 243-256, Summer.
    13. John Vickers, 1995. "Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(1), pages 1-17.
    14. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-150, June.
    15. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, December.
    16. Freebairn, K. & Trace, K., 1992. "Efficient Railway Freight Rates: Australian Coal," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 23-38.
    17. J. Gregory Sidak & William Baumol, 1994. "Toward Competition in Local Telephony," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 52984, September.
    18. John Quiggin, 1995. "Does Privatisation Pay?," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 28(2), pages 23-42, April.
    19. Panzar, John C., 1989. "Technological determinants of firm and industry structure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 3-59, Elsevier.
    20. Domberger, S & Meadowcroft, S & Thompson, D J, 1986. "Competitive tendering and efficiency: the case of refuse collection," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 7(4), pages 69-87, November.
    21. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    22. Stephen P. King & Rodney Maddock, 1996. "Competition And Almost Essential Facilities: Making The Right Policy Choices," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 15(3), pages 28-37, September.
    23. Varian, Hal R, 1985. "Price Discrimination and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 870-875, September.
    24. Waterson, Michael, 1987. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Natural Monopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 59-80.
    25. Simon Domberger & Eric Ah Lik Li, 1995. "An Ordered‐Probit Analysis of Price and Performance in Competitively Tendered Contracts," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 28(2), pages 14-22, April.
    26. Temin, Peter, 1990. "Cross Subsidies in the Telephone Network after Divestiture," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 349-362, December.
    27. Kay, J A & Thompson, D J, 1986. "Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Rationale," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(381), pages 18-32, March.
    28. Morris, John R, 1992. "Upstream Vertical Integration with Automatic Price Adjustments," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 279-287, September.
    29. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, December.
    30. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
    31. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    32. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-230, March.
    33. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2006. "Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior," CESifo Working Paper Series 1702, CESifo.
    2. Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2009. "Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(4), pages 599-621, August.
    3. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2013. "How should commodities be taxed? A supergame-theoretic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 196-205.
    4. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2004. "Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 577-600, March.
    5. Harry Bloch & Gary Madden & Grant Coble‐Neal & Scott J. Savage, 2001. "The Cost Structure of Australian Telecommunications," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 77(239), pages 338-350, December.
    6. Neal Ryan & Craig Furneaux & Anthony Pink & Kerry Brown, 2005. "Public Sector Contracting: An Australian Study of Changing Work Conditions," management revue - Socio-Economic Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 16(4), pages 438-457.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    2. Kotakorpi, Kaisa, 2002. "Access Pricing and Competition in Telecommunications," Discussion Papers 283, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    3. King, Stephen P. & Maddock, Rodney, 1999. "Light-handed regulation of access in Australia: negotiation with arbitration," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-22, March.
    4. Eduardo Saavedra, "undated". "Alternative Institutional Arrangements in Network Utilities: An Incomplete Contracting Approach," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv116, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    5. Alexander Galetovic, 2003. "Integración Vertical en el Sector Eléctrico: Una guía para el usuario (Vertical integration in the electricity sector)," Documentos de Trabajo 158, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    6. Marcel Boyer & Jacques Robert, 1997. "Competition and Access in Electricity Markets: ECPR, Global Price Cap, and Auctions," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-41, CIRANO.
    7. Marcel Boyer, 1997. "Competition and Access in Telecoms: ECPR, Global Price Cap, and Auctions," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-03, CIRANO.
    8. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 73-100, March.
    9. Felix Höffler & Sebastian Kranz, 2011. "Imperfect legal unbundling of monopolistic bottlenecks," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 273-292, June.
    10. Newbery, David & Affuso, Luisa, 2000. "Investment, Reprocurement and Franchise Contract Length in the British Railway Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 2619, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Carlo Cambini & Piercarlo Ravazzi & Tommaso Valletti, 2000. "La tariffazione dell'accesso nelle telecomunicazioni: principi economici e interventi regolatori in alcuni paesi industrializzati," ICER Working Papers 10-2000, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    13. isamu matsukawa, 2005. "Congestion pricing of inputs in vertically related markets," Industrial Organization 0506012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Fiocco Raffaele, 2013. "The Optimal Institutional Design of Vertically Related Markets with Unknown Upstream Costs," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 183-210, June.
    15. Matsushima, Noriaki & Mizuno, Tomomichi, 2013. "Vertical separation as a defense against strong suppliers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(1), pages 208-216.
    16. Zava Aydemir & Stefan Buehler, 2002. "Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply," SOI - Working Papers 0212, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    17. Machiel Mulder & Victoria Shestalova & Gijsbert Zwart, 2006. "Liberalisation of European energy markets: challenges and policy options," CPB Document 138.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    18. Bickenbach, Frank, 1999. "Regulierung und Wettbewerb im Bereich der Netzinfrastrukturen: Begründung, Regeln und Institutionen," Kiel Working Papers 910, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    19. Ingo Vogelsang, 2003. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(3), pages 830-862, September.
    20. King, S.P., 2000. "Does Structure Dominate Regulation? The Case of an Input Monopolist," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 767, The University of Melbourne.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:73:y:1997:i:222:p:270-284. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/esausea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.