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Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and its Effect on Collusive Behavior

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Author Info
Schindler, Dirk () (Meteorological Institute, University of Freiburg)
Schjelderup, Guttorm () (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)

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Abstract

We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in its series Discussion Papers with number 2007/8.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2007
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Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2007_008

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Postal: NHH, Department of Finance and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
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Web page: http://www.nhh.no/for/
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Related research
Keywords: Corporate tax systems; tacit collusion;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Rauscher, Michael, 1998. "Leviathan and Competition among Jurisdictions: The Case of Benefit Taxation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 59-67, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Steen, Frode & Sorgard, Lars, 1999. "Semicollusion in the Norwegian cement market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(9), pages 1775-1796, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2004. "Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 577-600, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jack Mintz, 2004. "Corporate Tax Harmonization in Europe: It's All About Compliance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 221-234, 03. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1989. "Tariffs vs Quotas with Implicit Collusion," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 237-44, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Michael Keen & Sajal Lahiri & Pascalis Raimondos-Møller, . "When is Policy Harmonisation Desirable?," EPRU Working Paper Series 98-02, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  8. Keen, Michael, 1989. "Pareto-improving indirect tax harmonisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Mintz, Jack & Tulkens, Henry, 1986. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-172, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Froot, Kenneth A & Klemperer, Paul D, 1989. "Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market Share Matters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 637-54, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Marvel, Howard P, 1982. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, April.
  13. Keen, Michael, 1987. "Welfare effects of commodity tax harmonisation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 107-114, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Haufler, A. & Schjelderup, G., 1999. "Tacit Collusion under Destination- and Origin-Based Commodity Taxation," Papers 8/99, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
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  15. Pinto, Brian, 1986. "Repeated games and the reciprocal dumping model of trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3-4), pages 357-366, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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