Individual Teacher Incentives, Student Achievement and Grade Inflation
AbstractHow do teacher incentives affect student achievement? Here we examine the effects of the recent introduction of teacher performance-related pay and tournaments in Portugal's public schools. Specifically, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis based on population matched student-school panel data and two complementary control groups: public schools in autonomous regions that were exposed to lighter versions of the reform; and private schools, which are subject to the same national exams but whose teachers were not affected by the reform. We find that the focus on individual teacher performance decreased student achievement, particularly in terms of national exams, and increased grade inflation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for the Economics of Education, LSE in its series CEE Discussion Papers with number 0112.
Date of creation: Mar 2010
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Teacher incentives; pupil attainment;
Other versions of this item:
- Martins, Pedro S., 2009. "Individual Teacher Incentives, Student Achievement and Grade Inflation," IZA Discussion Papers 4051, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Pedro S. Martins, 2009. "Individual Teacher Incentives, Student Achievement and Grade Inflation," Working Papers 29, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2010-05-02 (Education)
- NEP-LAB-2010-05-02 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-URE-2010-05-02 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- What explains the Portuguese PISA results?
by Pedro S. Martins in The Portuguese Economy on 2011-01-05 15:30:00
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