Price competition between subsidized organizations
AbstractMany firms and organizations compete for customers while at the same time receiving substantial funding from outside sources, such as government subsidies. In this paper, we study the effects of two commonly observed, alternative subsidy systems on the behavior of price-competing firms. Specifically, we compare an open-ended per-unit price subsidy with a closed-ended subsidy, allocated according to the firms’ market shares. We find that, holding the total subsidy budget constant, the open-ended subsidy results in fiercer price competition, lower prices, higher output, and lower profits than the closed-ended, market-share based alternative. Second, the open system yields higher overall welfare for relatively modest subsidies and limited substitutability between goods; the closed system performs better at relatively high subsidy levels and when goods are closer substitutes. Third, a market-share based subsidy makes collusive behavior between firms much harder. Our results, therefore, suggest a potential trade-off between short-run and long-run objectives: subsidies designed to widen participation may stimulate collusive behavior. These findings may have important policy implications for the design of subsidy systems in, among many others, education and the arts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2010019.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2010
Date of revision:
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Postal: Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerpen
Web page: https://www.uantwerp.be/en/faculties/applied-economic-sciences/
More information through EDIRC
Subsidy allocation rules; Bertrand competition; Incentives to collude;
Other versions of this item:
- Jan Bouckaert & Bruno De Borger, 2013. "Price competition between subsidized organizations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 109(2), pages 117-145, June.
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2010-11-13 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2010-11-13 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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