Collective Action for Watershed Management: Field Experiments in Colombia and Kenya
AbstractThe dilemma of collective action around water use and management involves solving both the problems of provision and appropriation. Cooperation in the provision can be affected by the rival nature of the appropriation and the asymmetries in the access. We report two field experiments conducted in Colombia and Kenya. The Irrigation Game was used to explore the provision and appropriation decisions under asymmetric or sequential appropriation, complemented with a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism experiment which looks at provision decisions under symmetric appropriation. The overall results were consistent with the patterns of previous studies: the zero contribution hypotheses is rejected whereas the most effective institution to increase cooperation was face-to-face communication, and above external regulations, although we find that communication works much more effectively in Colombia. We also find that the asymmetric appropriation did reduce cooperation, though the magnitude of the social loss and the effectiveness of alternative institutional options varied across sites.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad de Los Andes, Economics Department in its series Documentos CEDE Series with number 91169.
Date of creation: 12 Nov 2009
Date of revision:
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Collective Action; Watersheds; Field Experiments; Colombia; Kenya; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Q0; Q2; C9; H3; H4;
Other versions of this item:
- Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Rodriguez, Luz Angela & Johnson, Nancy, 2011. "Collective action for watershed management: field experiments in Colombia and Kenya," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(03), pages 275-303, June.
- Juan Camilo Cárdenas & Luz Ángela Rodríguez & Nancy Johnson, 2009. "Collective Action forWatershed Management: Field Experiments in Colombia and Kenya," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 006649, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- Q0 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2010-07-10 (Africa)
- NEP-AGR-2010-07-10 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2010-07-10 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2010-07-10 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-07-10 (Regulation)
- NEP-RES-2010-07-10 (Resource Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Artefactual Field Experiments
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Artefactual Field Experiments
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- D’Exelle, Ben & Lecoutere, Els & Van Campenhout, Bjorn, 2012. "Equity-Efficiency Trade-Offs in Irrigation Water Sharing: Evidence from a Field Lab in Rural Tanzania," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(12), pages 2537-2551.
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