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Centralized and Decentralized Management of Local Common Pool Resources in the Developing World: Experimental Evidence from Fishing Communities in Colombia

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Author Info
Maria Alejandra Velez () (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
James J. Murphy () (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst)
John K. Stranlund () (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst)

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Abstract

This paper uses experimental data to test for a complementary relationship between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and nonbinding verbal agreements to do the same. Our experiments were conducted in the field in three regions of Colombia. Each group of five subjects played 10 rounds of an open access common pool resource game, and 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions— communication alone, two external regulations that differed by the level of enforcement, and communication combined with each of the two regulations. Our results suggest that the hypothesis of a complementary relationship between communication and external regulation is supported for some combinations of regions and regulations, but cannot be supported in general. We therefore conclude that the determination of whether formal regulations and informal communication are complementary must be made on a community-by-community basis.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2006-3.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dre:wpaper:2006-3

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Related research
Keywords: common pool resources; experiments; institutions; communication; regulation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Klaus Moeltner & James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund & Maria Alejandra Velez, 2007. "Processing Data from Social Dilemma Experiments: A Bayesian Comparison of Parametric Estimators," Working Papers 07-013, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics & University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Maria Claudia Lopez & James J. Murphy & John M Spraggon & John K. Stranlund, 2008. "Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts to Support Cooperation? Evidence from Field Experiments in Colombia," Working Papers 2008-4, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

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