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Centralized and Decentralized Management of Local Common Pool Resources in the Developing World: Experimental Evidence from Fishing Communities in Colombia

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  • Maria Alejandra Velez

    ()
    (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst)

  • James J. Murphy

    ()
    (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst)

  • John K. Stranlund

    ()
    (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst)

Abstract

This paper uses experimental data to test for a complementary relationship between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and nonbinding verbal agreements to do the same. Our experiments were conducted in the field in three regions of Colombia. Each group of five subjects played 10 rounds of an open access common pool resource game, and 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions— communication alone, two external regulations that differed by the level of enforcement, and communication combined with each of the two regulations. Our results suggest that the hypothesis of a complementary relationship between communication and external regulation is supported for some combinations of regions and regulations, but cannot be supported in general. We therefore conclude that the determination of whether formal regulations and informal communication are complementary must be made on a community-by-community basis.

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File URL: http://courses.umass.edu/resec/workingpapers/documents/resecworkingpaper2006-3.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2006-3.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dre:wpaper:2006-3

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Web page: http://www.umass.edu/resec/
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Keywords: common pool resources; experiments; institutions; communication; regulation;

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References

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  1. John List & David Reiley, 2008. "Field experiments," Artefactual Field Experiments 00091, The Field Experiments Website.
  2. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
  3. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
  4. Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2002. "Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 379-395, March.
  5. Bischoff, Ivo, 2007. "Institutional choice versus communication in social dilemmas--An experimental approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 20-36, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Oscar Santis & Carlos Chávez, 2014. "Extraction of natural resources in contexts of abundance and scarcity: An experimental analysis on non-compliance with quotas in management and exploitation areas of benthic resources in central-south," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 41(1 Year 20), pages 89-123, June.
  2. Klaus Moeltner & James J. Murphy & John K. Stranlund & Maria Alejandra Velez, 2007. "Processing Data from Social Dilemma Experiments: A Bayesian Comparison of Parametric Estimators," Working Papers 07-013, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics & University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics.
  3. Moreno-Sanchez, Rocio del Pilar & Maldonado, Jorge Higinio, 2009. "Can Co-Management Improve the Governance of A Common- Pool Resource? Lessons From A Framed Field Experiment in A Marine Protected Area in the Colombian Caribbean," Documentos CEDE Series 60731, Universidad de Los Andes, Economics Department.
  4. del Pilar Moreno-Sánchez, Rocío & Maldonado, Jorge Higinio, 2010. "Evaluating the role of co-management in improving governance of marine protected areas: An experimental approach in the Colombian Caribbean," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 2557-2567, October.
  5. Maria Claudia Lopez & James J. Murphy & John M Spraggon & John K. Stranlund, 2008. "Does Government Regulation Complement Existing Community Efforts to Support Cooperation? Evidence from Field Experiments in Colombia," Working Papers 2008-4, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
  6. Anderies, John M. & Janssen, Marco A. & Bousquet, François & Cardenas, Juan-Camilo & Castillo, Daniel & Lopez, Maria-Claudio & Tobias, Robert & Vollan, Björn & Wutich, Amber, 2011. "The challenge of understanding decisions in experimental studies of common pool resource governance," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(9), pages 1571-1579, July.
  7. Narloch, Ulf & Pascual, Unai & Drucker, Adam G., 2012. "Collective Action Dynamics under External Rewards: Experimental Insights from Andean Farming Communities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 2096-2107.

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