Tragedy of the common canal
AbstractThis paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of alternative solutions to a common-pool resource with a unidirectional flow. The focus is on the comparative economic efficiency of communications, bilateral “Coasian” bargaining, auctions and price-based allocations. All treatments improve allocative efficiency relative to a baseline environment. Communication and bilateral bargaining are not generally as effective as market allocations. An exogenously imposed, optimal fee results in the greatest efficiency gain, followed by auction allocations that determine the usage fee endogenously.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20838.
Date of creation: 19 Feb 2010
Date of revision:
externalities; experiments; auctions; Coasian bargaining; common pool resource;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-03-06 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-03-06 (Experimental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Burtraw, Dallas & Goeree, Jacob & Holt, Charles A. & Myers, Erica & Palmer, Karen & Shobe, William, 2008.
"Collusion in Auctions for Emission Permits: An Experimental Analysis,"
dp-08-36, Resources For the Future.
- Dallas Burtraw & Jacob Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Erica Myers & Karen Palmer & William Shobe, 2009. "Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4), pages 672-691.
- Juan-Camilo Cardenas & John Stranlund & Cleve Willis, 2002.
"Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality,"
Artefactual Field Experiments
00030, The Field Experiments Website.
- Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2002. "Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 379-395, March.
- Budescu, David V. & Au, Wing Tung & Chen, Xiao-Ping, 1997. "Effects of Protocol of Play and Social Orientation on Behavior in Sequential Resource Dilemmas," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 179-193, March.
- Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004.
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
- Charles A. Holt & William Shobe & Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer & Jacob K. Goeree, 2007. "Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," Reports 2007-03, Center for Economic and Policy Studies.
- Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2000.
"Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out,"
Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1719-1733, October.
- Juan-Camilo Cardenas & John Stranlund & Cleve Willis, 2000. "Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out," Artefactual Field Experiments 00028, The Field Experiments Website.
- Cary Deck & Cathleen Johnson, 2004. "Link bidding in laboratory networks," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 359-372, 04.
- Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, 1993. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 93-112, Fall.
- Walker, James M. & Gardner, Roy & Ostrom, Elinor, 1990. "Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 203-211, November.
- Aida, Takeshi, 2011. "Social Capital as an Instrument for Common Pool Resource Management:A Case Study of Irrigation Management in Sri Lanka," Working Papers 33, JICA Research Institute.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.