Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Cost Benefit Analyses versus Referenda

Contents:

Author Info

  • Martin J. Osborne
  • Matthew A. Turner

Abstract

We consider a planner who chooses between two public policies and ask whether a referendum or a cost benefit analysis leads to higher welfare. We find that a referendum leads to higher welfare than a cost benefit analysis in a "common value" environment. Cost benefit analysis is better in a "private value" environment. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/650305
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 118 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Pages: 156-187

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:118:y:2010:i:1:p:156-187

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kenneth Hendricks & Joris Pinkse & Robert H. Porter, 2003. "Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First--Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 115-145, January.
  2. Cherry, Todd L. & Crocker, Thomas D. & Shogren, Jason F., 2003. "Rationality spillovers," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 63-84, January.
  3. Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2002. "Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 871-898.
  4. Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, 1994. "Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 45-64, Fall.
  5. Christopher Leggett, 2002. "Environmental Valuation with Imperfect Information The Case of the Random Utility Model," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(3), pages 343-355, November.
  6. Abhijit Banerjee & Rohini Somanathan, 2001. "A Simple Model Of Voice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 189-227, February.
  7. Hahn, Robert W., 1999. "The Impact of Economics on Environmental Policy," Working paper 529, Regulation2point0.
  8. Cropper, Maureen L. & William N. Evans & Stephen J. Berard & Maria M. Ducla-Soares & Paul R. Portney, 1992. "The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(1), pages 175-97, February.
  9. Carson, Richard T. & Flores, Nicholas E. & Martin, Kerry M. & Wright, Jennifer L., 1995. "Contingent Valuation and Revealed Preference Methodologies: Comparing the Estimates for Quasi-Public Goods," 1995 Conference (39th), February 14-16, 1995, Perth, Australia 148793, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  10. Smith, V. Kerry, 2000. "JEEM and Non-market Valuation: 1974-1998," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 351-374, May.
  11. Richard Carson & Theodore Groves, 2007. "Incentive and informational properties of preference questions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(1), pages 181-210, May.
  12. Audrey Light & Kathleen McGarry, 1998. "Job Change Patterns And The Wages Of Young Men," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(2), pages 276-286, May.
  13. Arrow, Kenneth J. & Cropper, Maureen L. & Eads, George C. & Hahn, Robert W. & Lave, Lester B. & Noll, Roger G. & Portney, Paul R. & Russell, Milson & Schmalensee, Richard & Smith, V. Kerry & Stavins, , 1997. "Is there a role for benefit-cost analysis in environmental, health, and safety regulation?," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(02), pages 195-221, May.
  14. Robin Gregory & Sarah Lichtenstein & Thomas C. Brown & George L. Peterson & Paul Slovic, 1995. "How Precise Are Monetary Representations of Environmental Improvements?," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 71(4), pages 462-473.
  15. Daniel A. Ackerberg, 2003. "Advertising, learning, and consumer choice in experience good markets: an empirical examination," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(3), pages 1007-1040, 08.
  16. Cherry, Todd L. & Shogren, Jason F., 2007. "Rationality crossovers," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 261-277, April.
  17. Adam Kalai & Ehud Kalai, 1999. "Strategic Polarization," Discussion Papers 1266, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Linzert, Tobias & Nautz, Dieter & Bindseil, Ulrich, 2007. "Bidding behavior in the longer term refinancing operations of the European Central Bank: Evidence from a panel sample selection model," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1521-1543, May.
  19. Michael Pries & Richard Rogerson, 2005. "Hiring Policies, Labor Market Institutions, and Labor Market Flows," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 811-839, August.
  20. David Dreyer Lassen, 2004. "The Effect of Information on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," EPRU Working Paper Series 04-03, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  21. Milligan, Kevin & Moretti, Enrico & Oreopoulos, Philip, 2004. "Does education improve citizenship? Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 1667-1695, August.
  22. Macmillan, Douglas C. & Philip, Lorna & Hanley, Nick & Alvarez-Farizo, Begona, 2002. "Valuing the non-market benefits of wild goose conservation: a comparison of interview and group based approaches," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 49-59, November.
  23. Shapansky, Bradford & Adamowicz, Wiktor L. & Boxall, Peter C., 2008. "Assessing information provision and respondent involvement effects on preferences," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 626-635, April.
  24. Han Hong, 2000. "Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1628, Econometric Society.
  25. John Morgan & Phillip C. Stocken, 2008. "Information Aggregation in Polls," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 864-96, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Technocrats vs. Referenda
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-05-14 14:17:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/108675, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

Lists

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
  1. Economic Logic blog

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:118:y:2010:i:1:p:156-187. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.