Group Decision-Making: An Economic Analysis of Social Influence and Individual Difference in Experimental Juries
AbstractIn a jury decision-making, individuals must compromise in order to reach a group consensus. If individuals compromise for non-rational reasons, such as a preference for conformity or due to erroneous information, then the final decision of the group may be biased. This paper presents original experimental data which shows that groups do have a significant tendency to compromise in jury-like settings. Econometric evidence also shows that features of groups, including the generosity of the group overall, will dictate the extent of compromise. The data also reveal that individual traits such as gender and capacity for empathy are associated with the extent of compromise in a jury-type setting. The implications are that interactions between individual and group characteristics limit the objectivity of decision-making.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 1128.
Date of creation: 07 Mar 2011
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Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Baddeley, Michelle & Parkinson, Sophia, 2012. "Group decision-making: An economic analysis of social influence and individual difference in experimental juries," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 558-573.
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-06-04 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-06-04 (Experimental Economics)
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