This article investigates the impact of memory limitations and memory distortions on the process of legal decision-making. I develop a simple framework in which jurors establish interim judgments, which are later used by a memory technology to reconstruct, in an inductive process, evidence related to those judgments. The resulting behavior matches a number of stylized facts that are inconsistent with the standard Bayesian framework. I show that beliefs in a given hypothesis may remain unchanged, and may even be strengthened, in the face of disconfirming evidence. This, in turn, implies that the beliefs of two jurors with different memory technologies may deviate further apart as they receive new information, accounting for heterogeneous, i.e. opposite verdict choices, and strongly held beliefs after a large amount of information is presented. Finally, I show that in this setup the probability of legal errors is highest for moderate strengths of evidence.
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