Hiring and Escalation Bias in Subjective Performance Evaluations: A Laboratory Experiment
AbstractIn many organizations the measurement of job performance can not rely on easily quantifiable information. In such cases, supervising managers often use subjective performance evaluations. We use laboratory experiments to study whether the way employees are assigned to a manager affects managers’ and co-employees’ subjective evaluations of employees. Employees can either be hired by the manager, explicitly not hired by him and nevertheless assigned to him or exogenously assigned to him. We present data from three different treatments. For all three we find escalation bias both by managers and by co-employees. Managers exhibit a positive bias towards those employees they have hired or a negative one towards those they have explicitly not hired. Managers’ and employees’ biases are connected. Exogenously assigned employees are biased in favor of employees hired by the manager and against those explicitly not hired.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by BELIS, Istanbul Bilgi University in its series BELIS Working Papers with number 2014-02.
Date of creation: Mar 2014
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-03-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2014-03-22 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2014-03-22 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jordi Brandts & Carles Solà, 2006.
"Personal Relations and their Effect on Behavior in an Organizational Setting: An Experimental Study,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (UAB) and Institut d'AnÃ lisi EconÃ²mica (CSIC)
692.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Brandts, Jordi & Solà, Carles, 2010. "Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 246-253, February.
- Prendergast, Canice & Topel, Robert H, 1996.
"Favoritism in Organizations,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 958-78, October.
- Daniel C. Feiler & Jordan D. Tong & Richard P. Larrick, 2013. "Biased Judgment in Censored Environments," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 573-591, January.
- Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817, August.
- Mark Granovetter, 2005. "The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 33-50, Winter.
- Christine Harbring & Bernd Irlenbusch, 2011. "Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 57(4), pages 611-627, April.
- Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, 2010.
"A theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and cultural change as informational Cascades,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1193, David K. Levine.
- Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
- Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- George A. Akerlof, 1997. "Social Distance and Social Decisions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1005-1028, September.
- Prendergast, Canice & Topel, Robert, 1993. "Discretion and bias in performance evaluation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 355-365, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ali Seyhun Saral).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.