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Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment

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Author Info
Jeffrey Carpenter () (Middlebury College and IZA)
Peter Hans Matthews () (Middlebury College)
John Schirm () (Google)

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Abstract

In many environments, tournaments can elicit more effort from workers, except perhaps when workers can sabotage each other. Because it is hard to separate effort, ability and output in many real workplace settings, the empirical evidence on the incentive effect of tournaments is thin. There is even less evidence on the impact of sabotage because real world acts of sabotage are often subtle manifestations of subjective peer evaluation or "office politics." We discuss a real effort experiment in which effort, quality adjusted output and office politics are compared under piece rates and tournaments. Our results suggest that tournaments increase effort only in the absence of office politics. Competitors are more likely to sabotage each other in tournaments and, as a result, workers actually provide less effort simply because they expect to be the victims of sabotage. Adjusting output for quality with the rating of an independent auditor shrinks the incentive effect of the tournament even further since output tends to become more slipshod.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2972.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2007
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2972

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Related research
Keywords: tournament sabotage real effort experiment

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Chan, William, 1996. "External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 555-70, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. van Dijk, Frans & Sonnemans, Joep & van Winden, Frans, 2001. "Incentive systems in a real effort experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 187-214, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Garicano, Luis & Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, 2005. "Sabotage in Tournaments: Making the Beautiful Game a Bit Less Beautiful," CEPR Discussion Papers 5231, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Christian Grund & Dirk Sliwka, 2005. "Envy and Compassion in Tournaments," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 14(1), pages 187-207, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Kong-Pin Chen, 2003. "Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 119-140, April.
  6. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nalbantian, Haig R & Schotter, Andrew, 1997. "Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 314-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Drago, Robert & Garvey, Gerald T, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bruggen, Alexander & Strobel, Martin, 2007. "Real effort versus chosen effort in experiments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 232-236, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. James Konow, 2000. "Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1072-1091, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Christine Harbring & Bernd Irlenbusch, 2005. "How Many Winners Are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage," IZA Discussion Papers 1777, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  13. Harbring, Christine & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2004. "Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection," IZA Discussion Papers 1340, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  14. Falk, Armin & Ichino, Andrea, 2003. "Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure," CEPR Discussion Papers 3834, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Nieken, Petra & Sliwka, Dirk, 2008. "Risk-Taking Tournaments: Theory and Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3400, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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